Bonard Constant Charles, et al.

De gustibus est disputandum: An empirical investigation of the folk concept of aesthetic taste

forthcoming

(CONDGE)

Comments:

Filippo Contesi 2021-12-3 21:57:2 UTC
This paper presents new evidence that is in prima facie tension with some of Cova et al.’s earlier contributions (e.g. Cova and Pain 2012, Cova et al. 2019). This new paper sets out to probe folks’ opinions on the distinction between good and bad taste. What the paper reports finding is that most people accept there is good and bad taste and that taste can be improved. At the same time, they are almost 50-50 split between subjectivist and objectivist understandings of what taste is. The authors of the paper conclude that, far from being a figment of aestheticians’ imagination, the paradox of taste is still present today. This conclusion is true. However, Bonard et al.’s argument to that conclusion risks not doing justice to the aesthetics tradition. The conflict between subjectivist and objectivist tendencies that the aesthetics tradition typically observes is to a good approximation expressed in terms of explicit vs implicit attitudes. These are conflicting attitudes held by the same judgers. At least immediately, however, Bonard et al.’s results suggest instead a mere split between two different sets of participants, i.e. those who express subjectivist, and those who express objectivist, understandings of taste. Nonetheless, Bonard et al.’s results are not incompatible with traditional observations in aesthetics. The nature of the relevant questions they ask of participants are in fact compatible with more explicit or implicit readings. Experimental participants are first asked the following question: “When we speak of people’s preferences about works of art (such as novels, paintings, music, songs, movies, TV shows, etc.), we sometimes make a difference between people who have “good taste” and those who have “bad taste”. Has it ever happened to you to say or think that a certain person had better taste than another one in this sense? (YES/NO)” (5) If they answer ‘yes’, then they are asked the following set of additional questions: “What do you mean when you say that someone has good taste? Please, explain in a few sentences.” “What do you mean when you say that someone has bad taste? Please, explain in a few sentences.” “Can you think of a person who, according to you, has good taste? Describe in a few sentences why you think this person has good taste.” “Can you think of a person who, according to you, has bad (or poor) taste? Describe in a few sentences why you think this person has poor taste.” (6) Such questions, especially when asked as a set, can be interpreted in different ways depending on the emphasis each participant gives to each question or component thereof. On the one hand, these questions ask of participants to elaborate their views about taste in quite explicit and general ways. On the other hand, the questions also touch on more operational aspects of taste than the questions Cova et al. (2019) asked. Whereas the latter asked whether disagreement about taste was to be interpreted in an objectivist or subjectivist sense, Bonard et al.’s four questions (a) ask participants to explain their own use of words (“What do you mean when you say”), and (b) ask them to describe examples that illustrate the distinction between good and bad taste. These latter two aspects of Bonard et al.’s questioning can be construed as ways of articulating in more explicit ways behaviours of aesthetic judgement that are more often undertaken on a more implicit level. These different aspects of Bonard et al.’s experimental setting make their questions more ambiguous between the explicit and implicit sides of the paradox of taste, than was the case with Cova et al.’s earlier experiments. This in turn can cause the split between subjectivism and objectivism in their results.